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Abstract
Cities in transition face a unique set of challenges that came forth due to interplay of the
legacy of socialist urban policies and transition to the market economy. The socialist urban poli-
cies restrained growth of the largest cities and distorted the spatial equilibrium towards more
uniform distribution of urban population. The transition to the market economy reduces distor-
tions but the convergence is slow. Housing market rigidities, inadequate urban infrastructure,
and inconsistent government policies prevent people from moving to the largest cities.
1 Introduction
This study focuses on problems of urban development in countries of the Europe and Central Asia
(ECA) region. The early stages of transition drew a substantial attention of researchers in urban
economics.1 However, the literature has relatively little to say about more recent developments
that have occurred during the last decade. This paper starts ﬁlling the gaps by studying various
dimensions of more recent urban developments in the region.
I analyze socialist urban policies that have a long-lasting eﬀect on distribution of cities within
countries of the region and on distribution of economic activities within the cities. For a long
time, central planners had been restricting internal migration to and industrial production growth
in the prime cities of the region, while encouraging development of the secondary cities. De jure,
restrictions were softened in some countries and abolished in other countries with the fall of the
communism. De facto, economic and political factors that prevent people from moving are still in
place, as internal migration in the region remains at a very low level relative to Western Europe. As a
result, convergence of the urban systems from the centrally-planned equilibrium to the market-based
one is slow.
I further investigate factors that lower population mobility in the region. Using data from the
Life in Transition Survey II, I identify that the housing market ineﬃciencies play a major role. A
This research was supported by the Global Development Network (GDN) as part of the intra-regional research
project on urban development in transition. I thank Tom Coupe, Randall Filer, Ira Gang, and participants of the 11th
Annual Global Development Conference: Regional and Global Integration in Prague, 2010 for excellent comments
and suggestions.
1See for example Alexeev (1988); Clayton and Richardson (1989); Bertaud and Renaud (1997); Buckley and
Gurenko (1998); Gang and Stuart (1999); Buckley and Mini (2000).
1standard deviation increase in the share of rented housing in the ECA region is associated with a 50
percent closing the gap in mobility between Western Europe and ECA, while a standard deviation
increase in the share of mortgaged dwellings is associated with a 25 percent closing the gap in
mobility.
Literature also mentions that absence of properly functioning land markets and poorly developed
local governance further exacerbate the problem of low mobility and lead to spatial distortions of the
distribution of economic activities within urban areas. In the market-based economy with eﬃciently
functioning land markets, the land prices act as signals that help to recycle ineﬃcient use of the
valuable land within the city and replace it with more economically sound activities. Absence
of land markets during the socialism resulted in the lack of the mechanism of land use recycling
and replacement, which led to economically ineﬃcient allocation of economic activities within the
socialist city. Since the transition to the market economy has started, the land market emerged in
all countries of the region, but the institutions regulating the land markets are still underdeveloped
and lack the legislative base. Quick reformers in Eastern Europe that have created those institutions
and developed the legislative base early on, were more successful in urban development, while slow
reformers are still lagging behind, having diﬃculties to revitalize their urban areas.
Under-sized prime cities in the region relative to the prime cities in other parts of the world are
a challenge for the policymakers. Larger cities are more attractive to skilled workers and investors
due to positive externalities brought in play by the agglomeration forces. Therefore the ﬁndings
presented in the paper lead to conclusion that the urban development policies in the region should
be channeled towards increasing internal mobility of population by means of reducing ineﬃciencies
in the housing market and developing market-based institutions that regulate land use within urban
areas.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 focuses on urbanization and distribution
of city sizes in the region. Section 3 discusses factors that distort the spatial equilibrium. Section 4
draws policy implications of under-urbanization. Section 5 concludes.
2 Urbanization and distribution of city sizes in the ECA region
Economic polices of the central planners during socialism were not favorable to development of large
cities. According to Ofer (1976), in the 60’s socialist countries were under-urbanized by about 9
percentage points relative to the OECD countries at the similar level of development. Ofer suggests
that the under-urbanization was a result of the development strategy to maximize the rate of capital
accumulation by suppressing rural-to-urban migration and diverting resources to development of
the secondary cities. The replication of Ofer’s methodology for 2008 demonstrates that currently
the ECA countries have reached levels of urbanization similar to the OECD countries as Table 1
indicates.2
2While it is not possible to compare directly the degree of urbanization for some countries that do not exist any
more, such as Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia, the table reports the population weighted averages of
actual urbanization, estimated urbanization, and residuals for countries that were former members of above-mentioned
2Urbanization rate in 1960, % Urbanization rate in 2008, %
Country Actual Estimated Residual Country Actual Estimated Residual
Albania 47 56 -9
Bulgaria 38 50 -12 Bulgaria 71 63 8
Czechoslovakia 57 62 -5 Czech Republic 73 73 0
Slovak Republic 57 71 -14
Average 68 72 -4
East Germany 72 61 11
Soviet Union 48 57 -9 Armenia 64 55 9
Azerbaijan 52 60 -8
Belarus 73 64 9
Estonia 69 69 0
Georgia 53 53 0
Kazakhstan 58 63 -5
Kyrgyzstan 36 43 -7
Lithuania 67 68 -1
Latvia 68 67 1
Moldova 42 45 -3
Russia 73 67 6
Turkmenistan 49 57 -8
Tajikistan 27 41 -14
Ukraine 68 58 10
Uzbekistan 37 43 -6
Average 64 61 3
Hungary 40 55 -15 Hungary 67 69 -2
Poland 47 53 -6 Poland 61 67 -6
Romania 35 50 -15 Romania 54 65 -11
Yugoslavia 28 48 -20 Bosnia 47 57 -10
Croatia 57 67 -10
Macedonia 67 58 9
Serbia 52 60 -8
Slovenia 48 74 -26
Average 53 62 -9
Overall 47 56 -9 Overall 63 62 1
Note: Urbanization rates for 2008 replication are from the World Bank. Real GDP per capita is from the Penn World
Tables 7.0. The OLS regression is estimated on a sample of OECD countries and then predicted for the former socialist
countries based on the following regression models
1960: UR=-35.71+13.93log(Y) Adjusted R2=0.25 (Ofer, 1976)
2008: UR=-53.11+12.44log(Y) Adjusted R2=0.10 (Author’s calculations)
Table 1: Urbanization in ECA region relative to OECD countries in 1960 and 2008
32.1 Urbanization rate
To test formally whether countries of the ECA region3 systematically diﬀer in terms of urbanization
from other countries, I estimate a linear regression model with urbanization rates regressed on the
set of variables speciﬁed in Davis and Henderson (2003):
urbanizationi =  + ECAi
 + Xi + i; (1)
where urbanization is the share of the urban population in country i, ECAi takes the value of one
if country i belongs to the ECA region and zero otherwise; X is the vector of controls that includes
log real GDP per capita, log population, openness to trade, landlocked dummy, log land area, voice
and accountability indicator that captures the average level of democracy in country i in 1996-2008;
i is the independently distributed error term.
First, the regression is estimated on a cross-section of data for all countries in 1991, 1998, and
2008, presented in columns (1) - (3) of Table 2. Conditional on the level of economic development,
population size, openness to trade, and geographic characteristics, the ECA countries do not system-
atically diﬀer in the rates of urbanization. The coeﬃcient of the log of GDP per capita is positive
and signiﬁcant in all regressions that conﬁrms ﬁndings from the literature of the strong positive
association between the level of economic development and urbanization.4 Column (4) presents the
random eﬀect estimation of (1) on a panel of all countries in 1991-2008 with no signiﬁcant change
for the ECA coeﬃcient.
According to Davis and Henderson (2003), urbanization is determined by a shift from agricul-
ture to industry and modern services. Column (5) controls for the shift by including the share of
agriculture to GDP and ratio of services to industrial production for a cross-section of countries
in 2008, but those variables turn out non-signiﬁcant. To address a concern that the result are
driven by endogeneity of GDP per capita, column (6) reports coeﬃcients of the regression for a
cross-section of countries in 2008 with a ﬁve year lagged GDP per capita, which does not change
the main conclusion. Finally, it might be argued that the ECA countries should be compared with
a narrower sample of developing countries. We report results from two restricted samples in 2008:
non-OECD countries in column (7) and low and middle income countries in column (8), but the
main conclusion stays intact.
2.2 Primacy
While the urbanization rates in the ECA region conditional on development, institutions, and
geography are not statistically diﬀerent from the rates in other countries, the distribution of city
sizes in the region deviates considerably at least in two important ways. First, the prime cities
countries.
3I excluded Mongolia and Turkey from the sample because these countries diﬀer substantially in terms of urban
development from the other countries of the region.
4See for example Acemoglu et al. (2002) for a discussion on evidence of the links between GDP per capita and
urbanization.
4(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1991 1998 2008 1991-2008 Ec. struct. Lag GDP Non-OECD Poor and mid.
per capita income
ECA region 0.024 0.042* -0.030 0.043 -0.010 -0.0080 -0.035 0.0025
(0.026) (0.023) (0.022) (0.034) (0.024) (0.022) (0.026) (0.026)
Log GDP per 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.12*** 0.027*** 0.10*** 0.12*** 0.11***
capita (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.0088) (0.023) (0.014) (0.017)
Log population 0.0017 0.0037 0.0037 0.12*** -0.0031 0.0029 0.0055 -0.023
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.014) (0.015)
Log country 0.010 0.011 0.013 -0.067*** 0.024* 0.014 0.013 0.034***
area (0.0088) (0.0091) (0.0094) (0.010) (0.013) (0.0096) (0.011) (0.011)
Landlocked -0.055** -0.060** -0.076*** -0.092** -0.046 -0.075*** -0.076** -0.11***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.043) (0.029) (0.024) (0.031) (0.030)
Openness to trade 0.028 0.036 0.042* 0.0039 0.011 0.041 0.040 -0.0058
(0.033) (0.033) (0.025) (0.0044) (0.036) (0.025) (0.028) (0.040)
Voice and -0.018 -0.017 -0.0055 0.074*** 0.0031 -0.013 -0.0049 -0.012
accountability (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.018) (0.019) (0.014) (0.018) (0.018)
Agriculture to GDP ratio -0.20
(0.28)
Services to industry ratio 0.012
(0.016)
5 year lag log 0.13***
GDP per capita (0.011)
Constant -0.93*** -0.84*** -0.70*** 0.067 -0.61** -0.72*** -0.72*** -0.60***
(0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.25) (0.12) (0.14) (0.15)
Adjusted R2 0.644 0.593 0.529 0.479 0.540 0.464 0.435
Overall R2 0.18
Observations 170 183 184 3457 150 183 157 134
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
Notes: Regressions of the urbanization rates on the level of development, population, openness to trade, institutions, and
geographical characterisitics. Data sources: urbanization rates are from the World Bank; GDP per capita, population,
and openness to trade are from the Penn World Tables 7.0; area, landlocked are from the CEPII Geo Data; ECA dummy
is equal to one for the ECA region countries.
Table 2: Urbanization rates
5in the region are small relative to the prime cities in other parts of the world. Second, the whole
distribution of city sizes is skewed towards medium-seized cities at the expense of larger cities.
To support the ﬁrst claim, the following regression is estimated
primei =  + ECAi
 + capitali + Xi + i (2)
where primei is the share of urban population living in the largest city in country i, capitali is a
dummy variable that indicates whether the largest city is also a capital of the country, and other
controls are the same as in equation (1). The regression is estimated on a cross-section of data for
all countries in 1991, 1998, and 2008, presented in columns (1) - (3) of Table 3.
Unlike for urbanization rates, the largest city of the ECA region is 9.5 percentage points smaller
than in the other regions for a cross-section of the prime rates in 2008.5 This gap declines over time
– from -14 percentage points in 1991 to -11 percentage points in 1998 to -9.5 percentage points in
2008 – but the rate of convergence in 1998-2008 slows down considerably. This ﬁnding is robust to
diﬀerent model speciﬁcations, time periods, and samples.
Column (4) presents the random eﬀect estimation of equation (2) on a panel of all countries in
1991-2008 with the ECA coeﬃcient of  0:11. Column (5) controls for the shift from agriculture to
industry and services by including the share of agriculture to GDP and ratio of services to industrial
production for cross-section of countries in 2008. Column (6) reports coeﬃcients of the regression
for cross-section of countries in 2008 with a ﬁve year lagged GDP per capita, which does not change
the main conclusion. Finally, restricting the sample to non-OECD countries in column (7) and to
low and middle income countries in column (8) does not change the conclusion that prime cities in
the region are smaller than in other parts of the world.
2.3 Distribution of cities
I further look at the distribution of city sizes and its dynamics in several countries of the region
during the 70’s and 00’s. The obvious ﬁrst step in studying the within country distribution of city
sizes is to test whether it satisﬁes the Zipf’s law,6 which is one of the most striking and robust
facts established by urban economists. Gabaix (1999) argues that the Zipf’s law naturally emerges
if urban population in a country follows a proportional growth process. The proportional growth
hypothesis, a so-called Gibrat’s law, was tested for diﬀerent regions and countries and in general
was not rejected.
To check how well the distribution of city sizes in the ECA region ﬁts the Zipf’s law, I run a
number of regressions
ln(Sizei) =  +  ln(Ranki) + i;
where Si is size of city i and Ri is its rank within a country, for eight countries of the region –
5Davis and Henderson (2003) also ﬁnd that the prime cities in the centrally planned economies are under-urbanized
by 5 to 11 percent depending on the regression speciﬁcation.
6The Zipf’s law states that the number of cities with population greater than S is proportional to 1=S:
Prob(Sizei > S) =   S
 1.
6(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
1991 1998 2008 1991-2008 Ec. struct. Lag GDP Non-OECD Poor and mid.
per capita income
ECA region -0.14*** -0.11*** -0.095*** -0.11*** -0.064** -0.098*** -0.11*** -0.072**
(0.031) (0.025) (0.029) (0.022) (0.026) (0.029) (0.030) (0.032)
Capital 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.095*** 0.070*** 0.10*** 0.12*** 0.096***
(0.029) (0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.023) (0.026) (0.030) (0.032)
Log GDP per -0.023 -0.025* -0.022 0.0049 -0.013 -0.019 -0.020
capita (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.0089) (0.018) (0.016) (0.015)
Log population -0.043*** -0.044*** -0.044*** -0.074*** -0.064*** -0.044*** -0.036*** -0.063***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.020) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012)
Log country -0.018 -0.018* -0.017 -0.0034 -0.011 -0.017 -0.020* -0.0059
area (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.013) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Landlocked -0.040 -0.029 -0.022 -0.013 -0.037 -0.024 0.019 -0.0081
(0.034) (0.028) (0.029) (0.027) (0.026) (0.029) (0.032) (0.030)
Openness to trade 0.062 0.053 0.050 0.0059 -0.044 0.052 0.083** 0.0020
(0.048) (0.057) (0.042) (0.010) (0.034) (0.042) (0.035) (0.035)
Voice and -0.013 -0.0093 -0.0078 -0.034** -0.025 -0.0049 0.0031 -0.022
accountability (0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.015) (0.022) (0.018) (0.020) (0.019)




5 year lag log -0.025*
GDP per capita (0.015)
Constant 1.03*** 1.07*** 1.03*** 0.95*** 1.14*** 1.05*** 0.93*** 1.09***
(0.20) (0.17) (0.16) (0.13) (0.23) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17)
Adjusted R2 0.476 0.479 0.444 0.506 0.446 0.450 0.509
Overall R2 0.46
Observations 165 178 179 3359 145 178 153 130
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0:1, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
Notes: Regressions of the share of population living in the largest city on the level of development, population, openness
to trade, institutions, and geographical characterisitics. Data sources: primacy rates are from the World Bank; GDP
per capita, population, and openness to trade are from the Penn World Tables 7.0; area, landlocked are from the CEPII
Geo Data; ECA dummy is eqaul to one for the ECA region countries; share of agriculture in GDP and ratio of services
to industry are from the WDI.
Table 3: Primacy
7Belarus Czech Rep. Kazakhstan Latvia Hungary Poland Russia Ukraine
Panel A: Zip’s Law in 1979. Dependent variable is ln(Size1979)
ln(Rank1979) -0.873*** -1.119*** -0.937*** -0.686*** -1.119*** -1.113*** -1.017*** -0.966***
(0.029) (0.057) (0.044) (0.069) (0.121) (0.017) (0.012) (0.019)
Constant 12.307*** 15.094*** 13.502*** 9.118*** 15.149*** 16.338*** 16.648*** 14.907***
(0.317) (0.593) (0.462) (0.725) (1.267) (0.179) (0.130) (0.203)
R2 0.977 0.970 0.963 0.940 0.950 0.994 0.988 0.991
N 32 58 63 11 63 184 677 207
H0 :  =  1 18.76 4.37 2.05 20.75 .98 45.11 1.95 3.25
p-value .000 .041 .158 .001 .327 .000 .163 .073
Panel B: Zip’s Law in 2007. Dependent variable is ln(Size2007)
ln(Rank2007) -0.839*** -1.165*** -0.875*** -0.709*** -1.139*** -1.156*** -1.009*** -0.954***
(0.031) (0.067) (0.039) (0.083) (0.112) (0.015) (0.013) (0.019)
Constant 12.176*** 15.631*** 12.892*** 9.329*** 15.323*** 16.941*** 16.674*** 14.817***
(0.340) (0.701) (0.419) (0.880) (1.173) (0.157) (0.135) (0.204)
R2 0.972 0.972 0.962 0.926 0.953 0.994 0.985 0.988
N 39 63 60 10 61 219 697 206
H0 :  =  1 26.36 6.08 10.09 12.29 1.54 112.08 .49 5.74
p-value .000 .016 .002 .008 .218 .000 .486 .018
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses.
Table 4: Zip’s Law for selected ECA countries in 1979 and 2007
Belarus, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Latvia, Poland, Russia, and Ukraine – and for
two time periods: 1979 and 2007. Data for population of the cities in 1979 are from the census.
Data for population of the cities in 2007 are from the World Gazetteer database. 7 Only cities with
population exceeding 20,000 inhabitants are included.
Results are presented in Table 4. To check whether the distribution follows the Zipf’s law, the
table reports F statistic and p-value of the Wald test H0 :  =  1. The Zipf’s law hypothesis is
rejected in both periods for Belarus, Czech Republic, Latvia, and Poland. The hypothesis is also
rejected for Kazakhstan and Ukraine in 2007. Only for two countries – Hungary and Russia – the
Zipf’s law hypothesis can not be rejected for both periods.
As the next step, I analyze the regression residuals. Figure 1 reports a panel of scatterplots of
the residuals against ln(Ranki) for each country and time period in the sample. The ﬁnding from
the literature is that the largest city is usually a positive outlier – its size is larger than predicted
by the Zipf’s law (see, for example, Gabaix, 1999; Ades and Glaeser, 1995, for a political economy
explanation to this stylized fact). However, it is generally not the case for the countries in the ECA
region. In particular, the upper part of the distribution for the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) countries and for Poland considerably deviates from the power distribution and has
the negative residuals. The deviation is the most pronounced for Russia, where the 30 largest cities
have population below the levels predicted by the Zipf’s law. At the same time, the secondary cities
in the CIS countries and Poland tend to be positive outliers, which indicates larger than expected city
sizes in the middle of the distribution. Also, there are no large and systematic diﬀerences between
72007 data is available at http://world-gazetteer.com. For Hungary and the Czech Republic the earlier samples
are for 1980, for Poland the earlier sample is for 1981.
8Figure 1: Zipf’s regression residuals for selected countries
the 1979 and 2007 residuals, which is quite an unexpected result given the dramatic economic and
political changes in the region between 1979 and 2007.
These preliminary observations on the peculiarities of the distribution of city sizes in the ECA
region probably indicate a large and long-lasting impact of the socialist urban policies on the city
growth rates. The concern with under-sized prime cities in the ECA region stems from the fact that
the urban economies of scale in the region are not fully exploited, resulting in lower productivity
per worker and lower wages in the region relative to urban agglomerations in other parts of the
world. The loss of competitiveness due to lower urbanization transforms into lower economic growth
(Henderson, 2003). Deichmann and Henderson (2000) compute that Poland’s primacy rate, which
is 5 percent below the optimal level, translates into 0.75 percent decline in economic growth. In the
next section I discuss factors that explain under-population of the prime cities in the region.
3 Socialist urban policy and population mobility
A spatial location theory (SLT) is built around the idea that an individual is indiﬀerent about
living in a particular location or moving to another one. A higher income earned by the individual
in primary cities relative to individuals in secondary cities is compensated by higher housing prices,
higher transportation costs, and more congestion, which makes the primary cities as attractive as
any other cities. The SLT crucially relies on eﬃcient and properly functioning markets. The general
equilibrium in spatial economic activities is achieved through three indiﬀerence conditions: workers
are indiﬀerent whether to stay in one location or to move to another, ﬁrms are indiﬀerent whether
to hire more workers or not, and construction ﬁrms are indiﬀerent whether to build more houses
in that location or not (Glaeser and Gottlieb, 2009). Those assumptions approximate realities of
the US economy quite well. A high mobility of US population, high competition among ﬁrms, and
9elastic supply of housing makes this model suitable for the analysis of the US economy. However,
the likely violation of the underlying assumptions of the SLT for the ECA countries cast doubts
on its applicability to analyze the distribution of population, housing, and ﬁrms in the ECA region
countries and potentially can explain the stylized facts presented in the previous section.
Did the shock introduced by the central planners to the market equilibrium led to the irreversible
shift in the equilibrium distribution of cities within countries of the ECA region which did not
disappear after the policies had been removed? Several studies looked at historically provided
sources of exogenous variation that would potentially address the question of the uniqueness of
the market equilibrium. Davis and Weinstein (2002) tested the multiplicity of equilibria for city
location that comes from the new economic geography models by looking at the impact of the
bombing of Japanese cities on the spatial distribution of population and found little support for
the multiplicity of equilibria. To the contrary, they found that the location fundamentals such
as favorable geographic location play a major role in location of cities. Bosker et al. (2007) also
presented empirical evidences in favor of the unique equilibrium based on German data. However,
those studies have been criticized on the basis that those ﬁndings can not be conclusive due to
the insuﬃcient size of the shock. In addition, more evidence from other countries, especially from
countries that have large territories, such as Russia would strengthen the results.
Mikhailova (2010), who studies the eﬀect of the soviet regional policies, including the system of
GULAG prisons and labor camps on development of urban settlements in Russia, ﬁnds that unlike
Japanese and German urban systems, the USSR urban system has experienced a large and persistent
shock, which still lasts in one-third of the urban settlements. In what follows, I review socialist urban
policies and discuss factors that can explain why, unlike in Japan and Germany, urban systems in
the post-socialist countries are more prone to multiplicity of equilibria. In particular, I focus on the
eﬀect of housing and land market rigidities and ineﬃcient local governance.
3.1 Socialist urban policies and their impact on spatial equilibrium of cities
This section discusses socialist urban policies and their impact on migration and distribution of city
sizes. I mostly focus on urban development policies in the Soviet Union, bearing in mind that other
countries of the region had similar, albeit softer policies, taking into account local conditions and
shorter period of time under the socialism. Ofer (1976) argues that the central planners intentionally
checked rural-to-urban migration and industrial development of large cities and engaged in input
substitution policy by keeping the capital-to-labor ratio in urban areas above the level of the market
economies and by keeping the capital-to-labor ratio in rural areas below the level of the market
economies. They did so to economize on costs that are incurred in urbanization when a migrant
moves from the rural to urban area due to higher wages and higher consumption levels of the
urban dwellers. All saved resources were further reinvested into the heavy industry production, a
development strategy consistent with the idea that the capital accumulation is the major factor
leading to the accelerated economic growth.
10Migration restrictions in the Soviet Union worked through the system of internal passports8 and
through the residence authorization system (so-called “propiska”). Both the internal passport and
the authorization stamp were legally required to get a job in a number of large metropolitan areas,
with the strictest enforcement in Moscow, St. Peterburgh, and republican capitals of the Soviet
Union. The institution of “propiska” has created a dualistic structure of population in restricted
cities where the population split into legal and illegal residents with discriminated access to public
goods, local amenities, state-provided housing, and jobs. Gang and Stuart (1999) estimate the
eﬀectiveness of the migration restrictions by looking at the diﬀerences of urban population growth
rates between restricted and unrestricted cities in Russia and ﬁnd that the restricted cities grew
approximately at a twice lower rate relative to the unrestricted cities in all decades between 1960’s
and 1980’s. Clayton and Richardson (1989) further ﬁnd the evidence that the restrictions were
more strictly enforced in larger cities,9 which led to below natural rate of growth in the prime cities
and consequent deviation from the Zipf’s law. Migration controls imposed in the most attractive
for migrants parts of the Soviet Union created a disequilibrium in the spatial distribution of the
population (Gang and Stuart, 1999; Iyer, 2003), which currently slowly corrects itself by the above
the average migration ﬂows to the largest cities.
The development and growth in the unrestricted cities – by and large small- to medium-sized
cities with population in a range 200-500 thousands people, often in remote and underdeveloped
areas – was promoted through channeling investments in industrial and infrastructure development
of those cities. The Soviet urban policy also promoted an eastward migration of population to
Ural and Siberia regions. According to the WorldBank (2009), the share of GDP produced by the
Eastern regions of the Soviet Union had increased from 4 percent in 1925 to 28 percent in the
1980’s. The incentives to relocate to cold, distant areas worked through the system of the Northern
compensations, preferential system of distribution of housing, creation of urban infrastructure in
new locations. Millions of people were subsidized to live in “cold” (Hill and Gaddy, 2003).
After removal of most of the beneﬁts, the population responded by out-migration from cold areas.
More than a million people left the Northern regions since 1990. The population of Magadan and
Chukotka, two of the coldest places in Russia, declined by 53 and 66 percent respectively between
1991 and 2001. Still, the self-correction of distortions created by the central planners is slow and
a considerable part of population in modern Russia still lives in cities that would have never been
built in a market economy.
3.2 Mobility in transition
Since the transition started, all countries of the region abandoned urban policies that distorted the
market equilibrium, but the convergence is slow, primarily due to low mobility of population in the
region relative to mobility in the developed market economies. For example, “on average Russians
8Rural residents did not have passports until 1974
9In the estimation of the rank-size regression for 500 Soviet cities, ten of the eleven largest cities are major outliers
– their actual sizes are well below the predicted sizes.
11change their place of residence 1.5 times during their lifetime compared to 13 times in the U.S. and
7 times in Britain (p. 61)”10 Even more disturbing, internal mobility is declining despite an increase
in the inequality across regions. Andrienko and Guriev (2004), who study intra-Russian migration
rates, ﬁnd that mobility has been declining in 1992-1999. The low mobility in Russia cannot be
attributed to income equalization across regions. To the contrary, Mitra and Yemtsov (2006) report:
“As opposed to relatively stable sectoral and inter-industry wage diﬀerentials, regional variation
in real wages, relative to the national average, almost tripled in Russia between 1995 and 2003.
Segmentation of labor markets is a common feature of many transition economies, but in Russia
this dispersion takes particularly extreme forms due to institutional, infrastructure and geographical
realities.” Yemtsov (2005), using oﬃcial per capita income data series, shows that between-regional
factors among Russia’s eighty-plus regions accounted for about a third of the overall inequality in
that country by the year 2000, with the increase in the between regions component being the key
driver of the change in inequality between 1995 and 2000. Fedorov (2002) computed that the Gini
coeﬃcient of intra-regional inequality in Russia in 1999 was 0.29 compared with the intra-state Gini
coeﬃcient in US around 0.10 (Milanovic, 2005).
Other countries of the region follow similar migration trends. WorldBank (2009) reports that
migration ﬂows in Eastern Europe and CIS countries have slowed down despite increasing diﬀerences
in income levels and quality of life. Internal migration in the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia
is 0.5 percent of working population which is low by the EU standards: it is three times lower than
in Germany and ﬁve times lower than in France, the Netherlands, and the UK. Deichmann and
Henderson (2000) ﬁnd that in Poland the largest cities growth is slower than would be expected
under freely operating post-transition adjustments. They link it primarily to low internal mobility,
with rural-to-urban migration declining signiﬁcantly between 1986 and 1998.
The low and declining mobility in the region can be, at least partially, explained by rigidities
in still over-regulated and ineﬃcient markets for housing, local government services, utilities, and
transportation (Buckley and Mini, 2000). Coricelli and Hagemeyer (1995) estimate that up to 20
percent of unemployment in Poland is due to housing market rigidities. There was a dramatic drop
in housing completion in Poland from 140,000 in 1992 to 60,000 in 1996. More recent analysis of
internal migration in Poland by Ghatak et al. (2008) conﬁrms that the shortage of housing remains
one of the most important barriers to migration within Poland which slows down growth of large
cities in Poland and lowers productivity and economic growth.
The situation with low mobility in the ECA region is worsened by the government policies that
preserve the current status quo through unemployment beneﬁts and direct subsidies to depressed
regions, job protection regulations, and nationwide minimum wage laws. Transfer of housing own-
ership from state to residents at low or no cost during the early stages of transition and no tax on
land or real estate property in some countries (i.e. Ukraine) makes the housing and land markets
more rigid and less liquid which further lowers the labor force mobility. Under-provision of local
public services and utilities is reﬂected in the structure of household expenditures. While in market
10Rautio and Tykkyläinen (2008).
12economies the share of those services lays within 43 to 63 percent range, in transition countries it
is only 23 to 30 percent. Inadequate transport infrastructure can be linked to the socialist urban
policy heavily relied on the system of public transportation that does not work well in a free market
system due to lack of funding and increasing rates of private motorization.
3.3 Housing and land markets
Absence of liquid land and housing markets in the centrally planned economies without private
property on land and housing led to ineﬃcient land use, inadequate housing stock, and lack of
institutions and services that support transactions in those markets. There are mixed evidence on
the existence of the housing market in the socialist countries. Alexeev (1988) ﬁnds that housing
conditions in the Soviet Union were sensitive to income. This result is considered by the author as
an indication that the Soviet households were able to beat the system of non-market distribution of
housing: even though the primary allocation of housing was economically ineﬃcient, based on needs
and merits system; the secondary housing market allocated housing eﬃciently, based on such eco-
nomic characteristics as household income. However, a later study by Buckley and Gurenko (1998))
using richer data ﬁnd no eﬀect of income on distribution of housing, which indicates lack of market
forces in the allocation of housing under the socialism. Low quality of housing, standardization of
demand, and direct restrictions on demand for housing in socialist cities11, further distorted the
housing market in the socialist countries.
After years of reforms, the housing market liberalized considerably. However, the soviet legacy
of existing stock of housing, peculiarities of housing demand, and monopolization of construction
industry create considerable distortions to the market structure that is far from competitive. Becker
and Hemley (1998) report a negative impact of housing restrictions on poor demographic situation
in Russia. They have estimated that a ﬁfteen squared meter increase in living space of the household
would lead to an extra birth. The lack of oﬃce space in the highly populated areas is the direct
consequence of the prevalence of housing units built without space for commercial use. Lack of
reforms, poorly deﬁned property rights, and lack of the digitized information on property lead to
substantial transaction costs and poor investment climate that hinders investments in real estate.
The price mechanism in the market economy exerts a powerful inﬂuence on land use recycling,
replacing ineﬃcient and obsolete land use by more eﬃcient and modern land use. An increase in
prices of land in the inner part of the city drives out the ineﬃcient businesses and obsolete structures,
and increases job and population densities in those areas. Under the administrative-command
economy, the absence of land price mechanism eliminates incentives to re-develop. Administrators
that do not act as land use value maximizers respond to the changes in demand for land use by
developing construction-free areas at the outskirts of the city because it minimizes construction
costs. “Socialist planners made investment and location decisions under a system in which land had
no value, capital had no interest opportunity cost, and energy prices were a tiny fraction of loan
11A couple with minor children could own only one dwelling, which could not provide more than 60 m2 of living
space Alexeev (1988).
13Figure 2: Industrial zones as percent of total build-up
prices. Since enterprises could not capture any gain from redevelopment or conversion of land to
highest and best use, socialist cities often had a pattern of sprawling industrial plants, often using
what would be the highest value and highest density oﬃce and residential land use under any kind
or market system” (Malpezzi, 1999).
The absence of land markets in socialists cities, according to Bertaud and Renaud (1997), lead
to: positive population density gradient when the most population-dense areas are located in the
outer areas of the city but remoteness of housing is not compensated by better amenities such as
larger houses, better environment that are typical for capitalist cities; larger share of city area is
allocated to land-intensive industrial use, often occupied by obsolescent industries located in prime
areas of the city – build-up land used by industries occupies 31% of all land in Moscow compared
with 5% of all land in Paris, 6% of all land in Seoul, and 5% of all land in Hong-Kong (Figure
2); residential areas are concentrated in the periphery, which put additional stress on transport
infrastructure.
Bertaud and Renaud (1997) compare Paris and Moscow, cities of the similar size, in terms
of their land use and population densities and report that the median distance to the center is 7
kilometers for Paris and 10 kilometers for Moscow due to higher population density in the inner part
of Paris and higher population density in the outer parts of Moscow. Longer commuting distances
and concentration of the households in the periphery in Moscow, while jobs are mostly located in
the inner areas of Moscow, require more investments in transport infrastructure and creates higher
congestion and greater share of labor time waste. High share of land occupied by land-intensive and
outdated industries in Moscow means underused land near the city center, fragmented access due to
dense network of rail-roads required to serve the industrial zones, crowding-out of new, technology
intensive industries and services to the outer parts of the city.
14Table 5: Taxonomy of progress in transition countries
































3.0 2.0 2.5 2.5 3.0 3.0 2.7
The Baltics 3.0 2.0 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
Central and
South Balkans
1.5 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.5 2.0 1.8
Former Soviet
Union
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.5 1.0 1.1
Source: Buckley and Mini (2000), From Commissars to Mayors: Cities in Transition Countries
Notes: The scale is from 1 to 4 where higher numbers represent better score.
3.4 Local governance
Development of institutions and eﬃcient governance in transition economies also proved to be a
major challenge for reformers. Buckley and Mini (2000) discuss progress of transition countries
in local institution-building, safety net development, and private sector development. Based on
the literature, the main challenge of public policy reforms in the ECA region is to outline the
clear boundaries that separate responsibilities among various branches of government both verti-
cally, between the state and local governments, towards a larger independence, transparency and
accountability of local governments, as well as horizontally, between various local jurisdictions to
prevent the overlapping responsibilities and resolve a potential conﬂict of interest between urban
and regional administrations that may emerge due to urban sprawl.
A low accountability and transparency of local governments is another important challenge to
local economic development. It is still well below the levels of accountability and transparency
in developed countries. The local administrations are often appointed by the state or by local
legislative branches of the government which reduces their local accountability. Buckley and Mini
further summarize their ﬁndings by presenting the progress of transition countries in various aspects
of local reforms which is summarized in Table 5. Central and Eastern European counties lead in
the progress of local reforms in all dimensions of local governance reforms – political accountability
and transparency of the local government, safety net provision, and private sector development –
while the former Soviet Union countries considerably lag behind.
A recent study by Stastna and Gregor (2010) examines the extent of cost ineﬃciency of local
governments in a sample of 202 municipalities of extended scope in the Czech Republic in the
period 2003–2008. The exogenous variables that robustly increase ineﬃciency are population size,
distance to the regional center, share of university-educated citizens, capital expenditures, subsidies
per capita, and the share of self-generated revenues. Concerning political variables, increase in party
15concentration and the voters’ involvement increases eﬃciency, and local council with a lower share
of left-wing representatives also tend to be more eﬃcient. A comparative analysis, conducted for the
period 1994–1996, reveals that small municipalities improve eﬃciency signiﬁcantly more than large
municipalities. As a result, initially low diﬀerences between medium-size and large municipalities
have magniﬁed over time. More ineﬃcient local governments in large municipalities can be another
factor that explains the smaller than expected prime cities in the ECA region.
3.5 Impact of housing and governance on mobility
In order to assess the impact of market rigidities on mobility within the last decade, I use The Life
in Transition Survey (LITS) II conducted by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment (EBRD) and the World Bank in 2010. It surveyed almost 39,000 households in 34 countries,
including all transition countries.12 As a reference group, households in France, Germany, Italy,
the UK, and Sweden were surveyed, which gives a much needed basis for comparison. I keep the
observations on households located in urban and metropolitan areas and aggregate the data to the
level of the primary sampling unit (PSU). Table 6 reports summary statistics of the key variables
at the PSU level in Panel A and housing conditions within the area at the household level in Panel
B.
There is a striking contrast in mobility between the Western Europe and the other regions.
While 25 percent of respondents in the Western Europe moved into the urban area within the last
5 years, the mobility in the other regions is only 9-13 percent. The Western Europe also has the
highest shares of households that rent and households with mortgage. The most common way of
acquiring a dwelling in the Western Europe is purchase with mortgage (61 percent), while in the
CIS and Mongolia region the most common ways are either purchase without mortgage (35 percent)
or privatization (33 percent).
In analyzing the determinants of mobility, I use a linear model
mobilityi;T =  + Hi + Oi
 + Ri + Gi + Dc + i; (3)
where mobilityi;T represents the share of respondents that moved into the urban area i within the
last T years; H is a vector of characteristics of the housing stock in the area i; O is a vector of
housing market conditions (share of rented housing and share of households with mortgage); R is
a vector of labor demand and supply characteristics of the urban area (average education level,
unemployment level, share of self-employed, share of employed by state enterprises), G is a measure
of local government quality; Dc denote a set of country ﬁxed eﬀects; and i is an independently
distributed error term. The model is estimated by Tobit, because the dependent variable is censored
and takes values from 0 to 1.13
Table 7 reports the estimates of model (3). Two variables that measure how well the housing
12The LITS II is available online at http://www.ebrd.com/pages/research/economics/data.
13I also estimated the model by the ordinary least squares, which does not require the assumption of normality of
the error term. The results are similar and available upon request.
16Western Central and Eastern Southern CIS and Total
Europe Europe Europe Mongolia
A: Summary statistics
Share of households moved in 0.149 0.068 0.044 0.065 0.075
within last 5 years (0.15) (0.10) (0.06) (0.08) (0.10)
Share of households moved in 0.253 0.121 0.088 0.126 0.138
within last 10 years (0.19) (0.14) (0.08) (0.13) (0.14)
Share of households moved in 0.325 0.155 0.130 0.163 0.181
within last 15 years (0.20) (0.15) (0.11) (0.15) (0.17)
Share of detached houses 0.374 0.334 0.378 0.288 0.336
(0.32) (0.39) (0.38) (0.39) (0.38)
Share of townhouses 0.255 0.057 0.074 0.028 0.085
(0.30) (0.15) (0.15) (0.09) (0.19)
Share of rented housing 0.375 0.187 0.113 0.101 0.174
(0.25) (0.20) (0.11) (0.11) (0.19)
Share of households with 0.263 0.080 0.042 0.021 0.083
mortgage (0.18) (0.11) (0.06) (0.04) (0.13)
ln(Monthlyrent) 6.825 5.540 5.245 4.948 5.497
US dollars (0.36) (0.68) (0.55) (0.80) (0.92)
Share of unemployed 0.090 0.121 0.168 0.148 0.135
(0.11) (0.15) (0.14) (0.17) (0.15)
Education level 4.210 4.003 4.138 4.856 4.348
(0.82) (0.75) (0.66) (0.62) (0.79)
Share of self-employed 0.120 0.111 0.127 0.172 0.136
(0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.17) (0.16)
Share of employed by state 0.330 0.381 0.437 0.563 0.445
enterprises (0.27) (0.29) (0.26) (0.28) (0.29)
Level of satisfection with 3.327 3.134 2.844 3.052 3.074
local government (0.49) (0.53) (0.59) (0.50) (0.55)
Observations 181 294 244 349 1068
B: Housing conditions
Type of dwelling, percent
Detached house 36.6 42.98 55.13 50.97
Townhouse 22.45 8.09 7.63 2.78
Apartment 40.46 48.54 36.93 43.23
Type of ownership, percent
Rented 34.61 14.67 8.02 6.39
Owned 63.99 82.5 90.25 90.99
How dwelling was aquired, percent
Privatized 15.9 16.7 10 33.02
Purchased with mortgage 60.59 14.52 15.48 3.55
Purchased without mortgage 11.27 35.48 38.3 34.86
Cooperative 0.31 5.82 1.04 1.99
Inherited 10.02 24.87 34.03 25.23
Mortgatge currently, percent
Yes 41.57 8.65 3.87 1.78
No 58.38 91.35 96.13 98.2
Table 6: Summary statistics
17(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Share of detached houses 0.057*** 0.017 0.0026 0.026 0.014 -0.0085 0.0086 0.15**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) (0.06)
Share of townhouses 0.0055 -0.061* -0.067* -0.052 -0.097** 0.13 -0.076* 0.14
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.04) (0.10)
Share of rented housing 0.36*** 0.35*** 0.29*** 0.36*** 0.39*** 0.21*** 0.35*** 0.29**
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.1)
Share of mortgages 0.32*** 0.25*** 0.15*** 0.27*** 0.25*** 0.23** 0.30*** 0.13
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.1) (0.09) (0.2)
Unemployment 0.013 0.0094 -0.0058 -0.013 0.013 -0.028 0.10** -0.070
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.05) (0.1)
Average education level 0.026*** 0.0064 0.0010 0.0041 0.011 -0.00071 0.0094 0.063***
in locality (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
ln(Monthlyrent) -0.0034 0.0038 0.0041 0.0081 0.017 -0.056*** 0.016 0.0074
(0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02)
Share of self-employed 0.099*** 0.057* 0.024 0.086** 0.070* 0.022 0.090* 0.27*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.05) (0.1)
Share of employed by state- -0.0020 -0.0055 -0.012 -0.0011 -0.0030 -0.021 -0.0023 -0.0014
owned enterprises (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.09)
Average appoval of local 0.0047 0.0044 0.0030 0.0039 0.0061 -0.011 -0.0088 -0.035
government in locality (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04)
Country eﬀect No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Log like. 181.9 309.8 173.5 322.1 250.7 84.8 348.0 53.6
Observations 1068 1068 1068 1068 828 226 503 35
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01
Table 7: Determinants of population mobility
18market is functioning in the urban area – the share of rented housing and share of households with
mortgages – are consistently positive and signiﬁcant across all model speciﬁcations. Based on the
estimates of the baseline model speciﬁcation in column (2) of the table, a standard deviation increase
in the share of rented housing in a city of the ECA region is associated with a 50 percent closing the
gap in mobility between Western Europe and ECA, while a standard deviation increase in the share
of mortgaged dwellings is associated with a 25 percent closing the gap in mobility. Average approval
of the local government, on the other hand, is never signiﬁcant. However, the variable is a subjective
measure and the reference point for what does good local government mean may considerably diﬀer
across countries. The structure of the housing stock is rarely a signiﬁcant determinant of mobility.
Column (1) reports the estimates with the share of households that moved in in the last 10 years
and does not include country ﬁxed eﬀects. The speciﬁcation allows using cross-country variation
to identify the eﬀect of variables that do not vary much within a country (structure of the housing
stock, education, and quality of local governance) and can be interpreted as the long run eﬀect
estimates. Column (2), the baseline speciﬁcation, adds country ﬁxed eﬀects, to control for cross-
country diﬀerences in the level of development, education, institutions, and particularities of the
housing stock. Columns (3) - (4) present the baseline speciﬁcation for mobility measured with
T equals 5, and 15 years consequently. The economic size of the eﬀect of the housing market is
increasing when we look at the longer horizon measures of mobility. However, this result should
be taken with caution because the reverse causality problem becomes more severe once we look at
longer periods. In columns (5) and (6), I split the sample into the households living in urban and
metropolitan areas consequently.
The LITS survey is representative at the country level, but not at the PSU level. To address the
issue of a measurement error, I report the baseline speciﬁcation results for more aggregated data –
at the regional level (roughly equivalent to NUTS 2 digit according to the European classiﬁcation
of regions) in column (7) and at the national level in column (8). The share of mortgages retains
its positive sign but loses its signiﬁcance, perhaps due to the small sample size. The share of
rented housing, on the other hand is still signiﬁcant. Also, the diﬀerences in educational level across
countries start playing a role in explaining mobility, which is consistent with the model at the PSU
level without country ﬁxed eﬀects in column (1).
Based on the results, I conclude that there is a strong and robust positive correlation between
population mobility and availability of rented housing. Another robust factor that is associated
with high mobility is the share of households with mortgages. As a policy implication, stability
of macroeconomic environment and development of the ﬁnancial system might increase population
mobility through better provision of aﬀordable mortgages. Of course, these ﬁndings should be taken
with care due to endogeneity and measurement issues, which are not fully resolved in this analysis,
but as the ﬁrst step it gives a valuable insight into the causes of low population mobility in the
region.
194 Policy implications of under-urbanization
4.1 Agglomeration and localization economies
Underdevelopment of prime cities in transition countries prevents them from capitalizing on the
agglomeration economies. Smaller agglomerations have less productive ﬁrms, fewer innovative activ-
ities, fewer opportunities for human capital development, and less eﬃcient labor markets. Marshall
(1890) identiﬁes three main micro-foundations of agglomeration economies: labor market pooling
(better match and reduced risk), knowledge spillovers (localized learning), and input sharing (inter-
nal increasing returns to scale). In addition, the natural advantage, home market eﬀect, consumption
opportunities, and rent-seeking all can contribute to agglomeration (Rosenthal and Strange, 2004).
Based on the extensive literature review summarized in Table 8, Rosenthal and Strange (2004)
conclude that doubling of a city size increases productivity of ﬁrms located in the city by 3-8%.
Separation of localization (within an industry agglomeration) and urbanization (impact of city size
across all industries) eﬀects, carried out by Nakamura (1985) for Japan, reveals that doubling of an
industry scale leads to a 4.5 percent increase in productivity, while doubling of a city population
leads to a 3.4 percent increase in productivity. Ciccone and Hall (1996) ﬁnd a positive eﬀect of
the population density on productivity. Doubling of population density increases productivity by
6 percent for the US. Ciccone (2002) further ﬁnds that the eﬀect is 4.5 percent for a cross-section
of regions in France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK. Moretti (2004) ﬁnds that a percentage
point increase in the share of college students in a city raises average wages by 0.6-1.2%, above and
beyond the private returns to education.
A meta-analysis of the literature on the relationship between urbanization and productivity by
Melo et al. (2009) reveals that the eﬀect is region- and country-speciﬁc, with China, Japan, and
Sweden having lower returns and the US, France, and Italy having higher returns. Au and Henderson
(2006) argue that restrictions on rural to urban migration in China explain insuﬃcient agglomeration
of economic activity. Also, the urban agglomeration impact on productivity is stronger in the
services sector which is consistent with the notion that services strongly beneﬁt from proximity to
large urban markets.
Research on agglomeration economies in cities of the ECA region is scares. The estimated
agglomeration eﬀects are found to be stronger than for the OECD countries. Békés and Harasztosi
(2010), looking at Hungarian manufacturing data from 1992 to 2003, ﬁnd that ﬁrms that are engaged
in international trade would gain 16 percent in total factor productivity as the city size doubles, a
number that is twice larger that the upper bound for the consensus estimate presented by Rosenthal
and Strange (2004). Bruhart and Mathys (2008) ﬁnd that the impact of population density on labor
productivity in Europe in 1980-2003 has been constantly growing over time, mainly due to higher
impact of density on productivity in the Eastern European regions.14 Vakhitov (2010) , looking
at the Ukrainian ﬁrm level data in 2001-2005, conﬁrms that the agglomeration eﬀect is higher in
the ECA region. While the higher agglomeration eﬀect in transition countries is expected, due to
14Inclusion of the Eastern European regions rises the impact from 4 percent to 13 percent.
20Table 8: Literature on sources of agglomeration
Micro-foundation Paper Main ﬁnding
Input sharing Holmes (1999) More purchased in-
put in clusters
Labor market pooling Diamond and Simon (1990) Workers compen-
sated with higher
wages
Costa and Kahn (2000) Well-educated mar-
ried prefer large
cities
Knowledge spillovers Jaﬀe et al. (1993) More citations in the
same location
Duranton and Puga (2001) Cities are “nurseries”
for new ideas
Moretti (2004) More college gradu-
ates raises wages
Source: Rosenthal and Strange (2004)
the dynamic nature of transition from the command economy to the market economy, these results
should be taken with care because of noisier data, eﬀect of restructuring that is hard to separate from
the eﬀect of urbanization, and higher inﬂation rates. Still, the results indicate that further grows of
the prime cities in the region would generate substantial and positive agglomeration externalities.
4.2 Poverty and social instability in urban areas
Declining industrial production in the ECA region during the 90’s hits urban population particularly
hard, leading to a high incidence of poverty in the urban areas. According to Alam et al. (2005), in
Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia the poverty rate in the urban areas is higher than in the
rural areas – the fact rarely observed in developing countries. Macours and Swinnen (2008) present
comparative analysis of urban-rural gap in poverty in 23 transition countries of the ECA region.
First, the urban poverty is generally lower than rural poverty. However, there is high variability
of the urban-to-rural poverty ratio across transition countries. Urban poverty is higher in Belarus,
Armenia, and Azerbaijan. The highest gap between the urban and rural poverty (50 percent lower
chance of poverty in the urban area) is observed in Romania, Latvia, Lithuania, and Bulgaria. The
income gap between urban and rural poverty translates to non-income poverty indicators, such as
lower infant mortality in urban areas of Bulgaria, Romania, Russia, and Central Asia. Second, the
urban-to-rural poverty gap is increasing in the middle-income countries of the region. Breaking
the poverty into components, a wage increase is quite equal in rural and urban areas, while access
21and availability of services and infrastructure are much better in urban areas in all countries of the
region. “While rural areas might have had less access to services even before 1990, service quality
and availability often decreased during transition as high quality service providers migrated from
the rural areas to the cities or abroad.” (Macours and Swinnen, 2008) In most countries of the
region, migration of the younger, more skilled, population to urban areas lead to a human capital
advantage and consequently to the large wage diﬀerentials.
Factors that contributed to the high incidence of urban poverty in the region are reduction of
subsidies to urban infrastructure, several-fold increase in the share of housing and utilities in total
expenditures, overall deterioration of urban infrastructure due to poor maintenance, and unequal
access of urban population to the quality services and utilities. The secondary cities of the region
have even higher incidence of poverty – risk of being poor in the secondary city is two to four times
higher relative to the prime cities. Main factors contributing to probability of being poor in the
region at the micro level are a low level of education of the head of the household and large family
size. Urban population is also more vulnerable to the macroeconomic shocks – urban poverty in
Russia, Moldova, Armenia, and Georgia increased sharply during the economic crisis of 1998 (Alam
et al., 2005).
In addition to the economic problems, the soviet urban policies of encouraging labor migration of
Russian speaking population to the national republics, the Baltic States in particular, has created
social tension after the breakdown of the Soviet Union. Balockaite (2010) discusses social and
psychological problems the Russian speaking population of Visaginas, Lithuania is facing even after
twenty years of the transition period. Lost in transition, previously considered as the elite of the
Soviet working class, the workers of the nuclear power station are struggling to ﬁnd their new
identity.
5 Conclusions
This paper outlines a number of challenges faced by cities in transition. Even though the ur-
banization rates in most countries of the ECA region are in line with the urbanization rates in
other countries at the similar levels of development, the evidence indicate that the largest cities of
the region should continue to grow at higher rates relative to the medium- and small-sized cities
to converge to the levels consistent with the market-based spatial equilibrium. Under-populated
prime cities in the region fail to capitalize on the agglomeration economies to a full extent. This,
in turn, compromise the global competitiveness of local ﬁrms, reduce attractiveness of the region
for investors, and lead to brain drain of high-skilled workers who prefer more densely populated
agglomerations of the US and European Union.
Growing regional inequalities coupled with declining labor mobility in the region constitutes an
empirical puzzle speciﬁc to the ECA countries. Most researchers point out that the markets with
the largest rigidities that could explain the paradoxical pattern of increasing regional inequality and
declining labor mobility are the housing and land markets. The paper provides new evidence on the
22importance of the eﬃcient housing market for high population mobility. Other important determi-
nants of urban development are properly functioning land markets and eﬃcient local governments.
More successful countries of the region in terms of the urban development also have more eﬃcient
and transparent local governments. Therefore, decentralization and further democratization of the
local administrations is a priority for successful urban development in the region.
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